Will Israel escalate in Lebanon?

On November 27, 2024, the ceasefire in Lebanon officially took effect—at least on paper.
Many Lebanese people hoped this would mark the start of a new chapter, especially with Army Commander General Joseph Aoun and Judge Nawaf Salam of the International Court of Justice—two respected and capable figures—taking charge of the country’s political direction. To many, it looked like the long years of political deadlock and the latest war with Israel were finally coming to an end.

But reality moved in another direction. Israel had a different plan.
After trying to weaken Hezbollah’s military power by striking its top leaders and a large part of its military infrastructure—through Operation Badger, repeated air raids—and the destruction of several southern villages, Israel still failed to eliminate the group.
Hezbollah stayed firm in its position as an armed resistance movement that would not hand over its weapons or dismantle its military structure, no matter the pressure.

What followed was a sort of “deceptive ceasefire”: Israel pulled back from most of southern Lebanon but kept control over a few key points it refused to leave. It also continued to violate Lebanese airspace and carry out strikes against Hezbollah, approximately every day.

This new situation reshaped power dynamics inside Lebanon—both politically and militarily.
Today, many Lebanese wonder what the future holds as Israeli attacks keep increasing, Hezbollah refuses to surrender, Netanyahu shifts his focus from Gaza to Lebanon, and the U.S. position remains unclear.

At the same time, Israel has been sending direct threats, insisting on face-to-face negotiations with Lebanon rather than indirect or technical talks.
Lebanon, however, rejects direct talks, standing by its position that any discussion should happen through indirect channels.

At this point, the question arises: What does each side really want? The answer to this question may help in outlining the possible scenarios for the next stage.

• Netanyahu is calling for direct negotiations with Lebanon, while simultaneously maintaining pressure to disarm Hezbollah. In recent weeks, he has sent—and continues to send—field messages rejecting the reconstruction process, most notably by targeting a gathering of civilian engineering vehicles in the town of Al-Musaylih in southern Lebanon.

   

From the overall indicators of the past stage, it can be concluded that Netanyahu and Israel are working along two main tracks, both aimed at achieving the maximum possible gains.

The first track directly targets Hezbollah, by exploiting the current moment to fully remove its effective weaponry and dismantle its military structure. This is being carried out through continuous airstrikes whenever targets are available, the regular updating of the intelligence database, and international pressure on Hezbollah’s financial resources and supply routes. In parallel, there is political pressure on the Lebanese state to push it into exerting additional internal pressure on the party—whether directly or indirectly—through Lebanon’s internal political structure, in order to isolate Hezbollah and strip it of its weapons.

The second track is directed at the Lebanese state as a whole, with the aim of forcing it into compelled normalization with Israel under the principle of “normalization in exchange for safety.” The proposal for direct negotiations is intended to break the state of hostility within the Lebanese collective consciousness toward Israel; for, in Israel’s view, the mere act of Lebanese officials sitting with Israeli counterparts would, in practice, abolish the notion of hostility and open the door to a new phase in the relationship—one that would naturally be followed by further steps toward normalization.

• In contrast, the Lebanese state finds itself in an extremely delicate position, caught between two opposing limits:
  On one hand, the absence of any real deterrent capacity against Israel, especially amid the decline of what was once termed “diplomatic deterrence”; and on the other hand, its fear of an internal conflict. Therefore, the state seeks to maneuver between these two limits by offering calculated concessions to the United States, hoping to gradually and quietly disarm Hezbollah without direct confrontation, while at the same time insisting on Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the cessation of air violations, the release of prisoners, and permission to resume reconstruction efforts.

• As for Hezbollah, it does not conceal its strategy, which is firmly based on the refusal to surrender its weapons—a red line consistent with Iran’s ideological doctrine. Iran has not changed the essence of its regional strategy after the war; it still refuses to surrender in the region, though it may be willing to alter some of its methods without touching the core principle—supporting its allied armed groups.

   

Accordingly, Hezbollah is pursuing a strategy of “latent patience”—waiting and rebuilding its strength while redefining it. On one hand, the party seeks to redefine its internal strength as popular rather than purely military, a notion reflected in the massive scout parade it recently held, gathering more than 70,000 participants in Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium. On the other hand, Hezbollah continues to rebuild its military capabilities within the limits of what is possible, so that if a major war breaks out, it will have accumulated the highest possible level of readiness -- despite the ongoing human attrition caused by Israeli strikes and the fact that it is impossible to regain, or even come close to, the strength it had on October 6. And if no large-scale war occurs, Hezbollah will have preserved its rhetoric, reorganized its ranks, and prepared itself for the challenges ahead.

The Next Stage: Possible Scenarios

Today, Lebanon stands before a set of possible scenarios:

1. A large-scale Israeli escalation that would lead to subsequent negotiations aimed at drawing new lines of balance, shaped by the scale of the Israeli strike, Hezbollah’s ability to respond, and the possibility of Iran entering the confrontation Such an escalation would seek to impose new realities on the ground — destructive but strategic — to shape future negotiations in line with Israel’s current agenda.

   While the United States does not favor a major regional confrontation, a “surgical” operation that accelerates the process and resolves it sooner rather than later might be an acceptable option. This approach seems increasingly plausible in light of Barak’s recent statements and the series of diplomatic visits that have followed.

2. The continuation of the current status quo, marked by a gradual increase in Israeli strikes against Hezbollah, alongside mounting pressure on the Lebanese state — which, in turn, continues to expand its authority at Hezbollah’s expense.

   In this scenario, Hezbollah’s influence continues to wane as the state consolidates control both above and below ground — restricting Hezbollah’s ability to transport weapons inside Lebanon while the Lebanese army maintaining near-total control south of the Litani River. This effectively limits Hezbollah’s ability to preserve, repair, or strengthen its arsenal.

   Meanwhile, Israel sustains targeted operations against Hezbollah leaders, prevents reconstruction efforts, maintains full control over Lebanese airspace, and continues its economic pressure on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.

   Over the medium term, this represents a quiet, steady implementation of the American plan — gradual — especially as the Israeli army shows signs of fatigue and Washington favors a policy of regional cooling.

   Ultimately, this path points toward a calibrated war of attrition: sustained Israeli pressure designed to compel both the Lebanese state and Hezbollah to yield to imposed conditions — an Israeli-led campaign of attrition conducted from a position of superiority, without major costs or open confrontation.

3. A change in Hezbollah’s strategy: meaning the party’s transition from a state of “latent patience” to direct retaliation and escalation against Israeli interventions, or its retreat from its red line regarding disarmament, as a result of internal or regional shifts.
   However, this possibility remains weak, given the steadfastness of the Iranian position and the continued ideological and political structure of Hezbollah as it stands.

Israel is unlikely to rest easy as long as Hezbollah remains armed and while Israel has the opportunity to get more. At the same time, Tel Aviv sees in the current situation an opportunity to take its relationship with Lebanon to a new level. For that reason, a high de-escalation—where Israel halts its operations and withdraws from Lebanese territory—appears highly improbable, if not impossible, without receiving something huge in return. Nor are there any indications that Hezbollah intends to fundamentally change its approach.

Against this backdrop, and with the growing influx of international envoys to Beirut — including U.S. and European mediators, UN representatives, and regional officials — alongside increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward Lebanon, it is evident that the Lebanese file remains far from settled.

Based on this, the most likely developments remain confined to the first and second scenarios, both of which ultimately hinge on Washington’s decisive position. Yet, as official Lebanese statements repeatedly highlight the absence of a clear and independent U.S. stance toward Israel, it seems that Tel Aviv still largely steers American policy on Lebanon. This makes the path of escalation—whether direct or gradual—the most plausible trajectory in the coming phase.

Although there are still no concrete signs of a major Israeli military buildup along the border, the Israeli air force remains ever-present and ready, capable of swiftly intensifying its strikes whenever the political decision is made — reinforcing the impression that Lebanon remains caught in a volatile, highly controlled escalation dynamic.