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PoliticsEconomic

Power and Interests: Mapping U.S., Chinese, and Russian Strategies in the Middle East and North Africa

Published on August 21, 2025

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By: Mohamad Fawaz

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The Middle East has long stood as one of the world’s most geopolitically significant regions, rich in history, cultural diversity, and natural resources. Yet over the past several centuries, it has experienced a decline in its global leadership role—opening the door to sustained external interest and intervention. Competing global powers have sought to shape the region in ways that serve their strategic interests, turning it into a constant arena of influence and rivalry.

In this context, understanding the modern Middle East becomes nearly impossible without a thorough analysis of the interests and motivations of external powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia. These actors are not only engaged in a global competition but also view the Middle East as a key battleground for advancing their geopolitical, economic, and security agendas.

This foundational paper seeks to examine the strategic priorities of these major powers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)—a region that, for the purposes of this study, includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
 By unpacking the core drivers behind each power’s regional engagement—whether political, military, or economic—we aim to offer a framework for understanding not only their current behavior but also the evolving dynamics of the region as a whole.

Ultimately, the paper argues that a proper understanding of these external interests is essential for analyzing regional developments, as it sheds light on one of the key forces shaping the Middle East’s contemporary geopolitical landscape.

 

U.S. Strategic Posture and Interests in MENA

The United States maintains numerous enduring interests in the Middle East, even as its attention and resources shift towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Key interests include:

The United States holds a complex and evolving set of interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which, according to the sources, includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Despite a declared shift in U.S. strategic focus and resources towards the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States maintains numerous enduring interests in the MENA region.

Here are the primary interests the U.S. seeks to achieve in the MENA region:

  • Counterterrorism: A foremost and consistent U.S. objective is countering terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS), and preventing the region, from becoming a safe haven for such groups that could pose threats to the U.S. homeland, its personnel, and its allies. This objective has been a primary driver of U.S. involvement and often facilitates deeper relationships with regional partners, thereby deepening U.S. influence.

  • Energy Security and Freedom of Navigation: Ensuring the free flow of and access to natural resources, especially energy, is a critical and traditional U.S. interest. This includes maintaining freedom of navigation in key waterways like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab El-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, which are vital to the global economy.
  • Regional Stability and Strategic Partnerships: The U.S. emphasizes regional stability and strong partnerships in the Middle East, maintaining long-standing ties with countries like Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. These relationships provide vital strategic benefits, including military basing, overflight rights, and access to key maritime routes. However, while framed in terms of peace and conflict resolution, these efforts are fundamentally driven by U.S. interests—namely, projecting power, securing energy flows, and containing rival actors such as Iran, Russia, and increasingly, China. Stability is not pursued for its own sake, but as a means to preserve U.S. influence and prevent disruptions that could undermine its regional architecture of control.

  • Strategic Competition with China and Russia: The U.S. seeks to minimize Chinese and Russian influence throughout the region, especially in countries where the U.S. has deep ties or interests, to ensure the Middle East is "not dominated by any power hostile to the United States". The U.S. is challenged by China's expanding economic role and Russia's military alternative to the American-led order. However, sources note that great-power involvement in future Middle Eastern conflicts is unlikely to be driven primarily by concerns over competitors' expanding influence, but rather by internal issues like the resurgence of terrorist organizations.
  • Soft Power and Cultural Influence: The U.S. promotes democracy, development, and human rights in the Middle East as part of its broader soft power strategy. Through civil society support, educational programs, and humanitarian aid, it seeks to shape political norms, influence elites, and embed pro-Western values. While framed in humanitarian terms, these efforts primarily serve to expand U.S. cultural and ideological influence, counter rival narratives, and reinforce its long-term strategic presence in the region.

  • Unwavering Support for Israel: A central and enduring pillar of U.S. Middle East policy is its deep strategic, political, and ideological support for Israel. This alliance goes far beyond traditional security cooperation, encompassing intelligence sharing, joint technological development (particularly in missile defense and cybersecurity), and billions in annual military aid. The U.S. views Israel as a key anchor of its regional influence and a counterbalance to adversarial powers like Iran. Domestically, strong bipartisan political support and influential lobbying networks further entrench this priority. Backing Israel also enables Washington to project power into the Levant and shape the broader security architecture of the region in ways that align with its strategic worldview.

  • Countering Iran: A key and persistent interest is deterring Iran and countering its growing regional influence, cultivation and support of proxy militant groups (like the PMF in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon), missile programs, and pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran's actions threaten regional stability, the security of U.S. allies like Israel, and the interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The U.S. aims to prevent Iran from dominating the region.
  • Economic Access and Strategic Trade Routes: While oil remains a key concern, U.S. economic interests in the Middle East increasingly extend beyond hydrocarbons. The region hosts vital trade corridors (such as the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz) that are critical for global commerce and energy flows. Additionally, Gulf states present lucrative markets for American technology, finance, infrastructure, and energy transition investment—particularly in areas like renewables, hydrogen, and digital infrastructure. Ensuring open access to these economic opportunities—and preventing strategic competitors like China from dominating them—is a growing dimension of U.S. regional engagement.

  • Preventing Regional Nuclear Proliferation: While much U.S. attention is directed toward containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Washington is also deeply invested in preventing a broader nuclear arms race in the region. The fear that countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Turkey could seek nuclear capabilities in response to Iran underpins U.S. efforts to uphold the global non-proliferation regime. Maintaining the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discouraging regional proliferation are seen as vital to preserving U.S. strategic stability and preventing the erosion of long-standing international norms.

  • Arms Trade and Defense Industry Interests: The Middle East is one of the largest markets for American arms exports, and U.S. defense sales to partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Israel serve both strategic and economic functions. These sales are not only a source of revenue for the U.S. defense industry, but also a tool of influence—ensuring military interoperability, technological dependency, and long-term strategic alignment with Washington. Arms deals often come with maintenance contracts, training programs, and political strings attached, deepening U.S. leverage over client states. In effect, defense exports function as a form of embedded influence, shaping the military and security postures of regional actors in ways that align with American interests.

  • Managing Refugee Crises and Containing Instability Spillovers: Although not always publicly emphasized, the U.S. has a clear interest in mitigating the global fallout of Middle Eastern conflicts, especially in terms of mass displacement and refugee flows. Large-scale humanitarian crises in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere risk destabilizing allies in Europe and neighboring regions. U.S. support for refugee assistance programs, humanitarian aid, and multilateral mechanisms like the UNHCR is often aimed at containing the spread of instability and preventing these crises from creating wider security or political disruptions.

 

Washington’s Next Moves in the Middle East

Having disrupted Iran’s regional momentum, constrained its nuclear program, and degraded the operational depth of its proxies, the United States now views much of the Middle East through a lens of strategic containment rather than active confrontation. Simultaneously, the weakening of Russian presence—especially in Syria—and China’s limited political traction have reinforced Washington’s sense of opportunity to reassert a favorable balance of power in the region.

In this recalibrated landscape, U.S. efforts increasingly aim to stabilize the region on U.S.-defined terms. This includes promoting settlements in Syria that ensure Israeli security and limit Iranian influence and containing radical movements, continuing the process of disarming Hezbollah and restructuring the Lebanese political system in a way that excludes its dominance, and advancing processes that effectively sideline the Palestinian question and pushing more towards Arab-Israeli alignment. These initiatives are not driven by idealism or moral responsibility, but by a pragmatic logic of minimizing risk, reducing direct entanglement, and preserving U.S. strategic space.

Crucially, this approach aligns with Washington’s global strategic pivot toward great-power competition, particularly with China. The Middle East, in this view, must either become a stable, low-cost arena aligned with U.S. interests, or at least not emerge as a source of strategic distraction or vulnerability.

 

China in MENA: Trade, Energy, and Silent Influence

China's engagement in the Middle East is primarily driven by economic interests, with growing security considerations:

  • Economic and Energy Access: China's motivation is largely to gain access to energy resources and markets, and to pursue other economic interests. Most of China's top oil suppliers are Middle Eastern countries, and its dependence on oil imports from the region is projected to increase. China has also invested heavily in telecommunications, power generation, and reconstruction projects in Iraq.

  • Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Middle East is a significant part of China's BRI, with Iraq being a prime candidate for infrastructure investments, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being a "flagship" BRI project designed to bring economic development to China's western provinces and create logistical corridors bypassing strategic choke-points like the Strait of Malacca.
  • Regional Stability for Economic Interests: China seeks to promote stability in the Middle East to protect its energy and economic interests, as instability threatens its large investments and the thousands of Chinese citizens living in the region.
  • Counterterrorism: China is concerned about its Muslim Uighur population becoming radicalized by Islamist extremist ideologies and fears that radicalized Chinese citizens could return to China to launch terrorist attacks. Beijing views preventing instability and extremism from spreading to Xinjiang province as a primary interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Defeating ISIS and other jihadist groups is also a goal for China.
  • Diplomatic Influence: China encourages and enjoys diplomatic support from Iraq and other regional states in international forums, and seeks to maintain good relations with most actors in the region.
  • Great Power Competition: China views the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a critical arena for great power competition, particularly with the United States—primarily through economic means. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has significantly expanded its investments in infrastructure, ports, energy, and digital technology across the region. These investments not only secure China’s long-term access to strategic resources and markets but also enhance its geopolitical footprint. By offering alternatives to Western financial institutions and avoiding political conditionalities, Beijing presents itself as a more flexible and appealing partner to many MENA states. This growing presence, however, is increasingly perceived by Washington as a challenge to U.S. influence, especially in critical sectors like 5G, ports, and energy infrastructure.
  • Global South Leadership: China aims to enhance its status as a "responsible power" in the Global South, engaging through multilateral platforms like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

China has not engaged in any of the recent wars in the region, reaffirming its quiet strategy that avoids direct confrontation with the United States, which remains deeply and militarily involved in the Middle East. However, this low-profile approach has also slowed the region’s perception of China as a viable alternative to the U.S. in the near future. While this distance has helped China avoid regional entanglements, it may ultimately delay its rise and the deepening of its partnerships in the region—allowing the United States to maintain its strategic edge.

 

Russia in the Middle East

Russia's involvement in the Middle East is driven by a mix of strategic, security, and economic factors:

  • Strategic and Geopolitical Influence: Russia seeks to make itself an indispensable power in the region, aiming to undermine U.S. relationships and increase its strategic access to natural resources, waterways, and bases. Russia often exploits opportunities created by U.S. disengagement.

  • Security Concerns and Counterterrorism: The Middle East's proximity to Russia gives Moscow a compelling interest in regional security, particularly regarding the proliferation of global terrorist networks. Russia views ISIS and al-Qaeda as significant threats due to their potential to spread extremism into Russia's large Muslim population and neighboring Central Asian states, some of which are Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies.
  • Eastern Mediterranean: The Eastern Mediterranean Sea is an area of strategic concern, serving as a hub for Russian military operations in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine, and enabling Russian power projection. It is also a site of competition with the U.S. and Turkey.
  • Avoiding Direct Conflict with U.S.: Russia aims to avoid direct conflict with the United States, especially outside Europe, making proxy conflict a desirable alternative to strengthen its position while undercutting U.S. influence.
  • Economic Interests (Arms and Energy and investments): Russia's economic interests primarily revolve around arms and energy. The Middle East has been the fastest-growing buyer of Russian arms since 2014. As a leading energy producer, Russia has a crucial stake in the hydrocarbon market and seeks investments from wealthy Gulf nations.
  • Balancing Act: Russia endeavors to present itself as a responsible outside entity and mediator in regional conflicts, balancing complex relationships with various regional powers, including Iran and Turkey.

Russia’s ambitions in the Middle East have faced significant setbacks in recent years, particularly as U.S. influence has regained momentum. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria dealt a major blow to Moscow’s strategic foothold in the region, occurring at a time when Russia was already overstretched by its war in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia has been largely excluded from playing a substantive role in the Palestinian issue or in the unfolding Israeli-Iranian confrontation. These developments have widened the space for American engagement in the region—often at the expense of both Russian and Chinese influence.

The evolving dynamics of great power engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) reveal a region that is no longer simply a passive recipient of external influence, but a critical theater where global competition, local agency, and shifting alliances intersect. The United States, despite its strategic pivot toward the Indo-Pacific, continues to play a dominant—though increasingly recalibrated—role in the region, focused on containment, deterrence, and the preservation of a favorable balance of power. China, while avoiding direct entanglement in regional conflicts, has steadily expanded its economic and technological footprint through infrastructure investment and diplomacy, presenting itself as a pragmatic and non-interventionist partner. Meanwhile, Russia has sought to exploit vacuums left by Western disengagement to secure influence, particularly through military partnerships and energy diplomacy—yet its position has weakened due to external constraints and internal overreach.

What emerges is a layered and asymmetric competition: Washington operates from a position of military and institutional embeddedness, Beijing from economic entrenchment, and Moscow through flexible but fragile strategic maneuvering. While none of these powers can unilaterally dictate regional outcomes, their actions—and interactions—profoundly shape the geopolitical contours of the Middle East.

 

References:

  1. Trenin, D. (2018). Russia in the Middle East: Moscow’s Objectives, Opportunities, and Limitations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
    https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/14/russia-in-middle-east-moscow-s-objectives-opportunities-and-limitations-pub-75476
  2. Borshchevskaya, A. (2021). Russia in the Middle East: A New Front in the Global Conflict. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russia-middle-east-new-front-global-conflict
  3. Kozhanov, N. (2017). Russia’s Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Hedging or Opportunism? Chatham House.
    https://www.chathamhouse.org/2017/05/russias-policy-middle-east
  4. Rumer, E. (2019). Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
    https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233
  5. Korybko, A. (2020). Russia's Soft Power Strategies in the Middle East and Africa. Journal of Political Marketing, 19(2), 177–195.
    https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1754676
  6. Knights, M. (2020). U.S. Policy in the Middle East: A Report Card. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-policy-in-the-middle-east-a-report-card
  7. Barzegar, K., & Costantini, I. (Eds.). (2020). Great Power Competition and the Middle East. RAND Corporation.
    https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF411.html
  8. United States Army War College. (2017). U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army.
    https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/466
  9. Simón, L. (2023). China’s Interests in the Middle East and North Africa. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2023.
    https://www.iemed.org/publication/chinas-interests-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/
  10. Özdemir, H., & Al-Moumin, M. (2022). China’s Expanding Influence in the Middle East and North Africa. The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy.
    https://peacediplomacy.org/2022/03/25/chinas-influence-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ 
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