Published At: 07 May 2025
Rabih Dandashli
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Abstract:
This article explores the multidimensional crisis surrounding Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal in Lebanon. It examines the issue through three interrelated lenses: the internal logic of Hezbollah, the constraints and dilemmas of the Lebanese state, and the positioning of the international community. The article argues that any serious attempt to address this issue must engage deeply with its structural complexities, rather than pursue reactionary or superficial solutions.
Hezbollah’s Internal Logic: The Weapon as Identity and Survival
Hezbollah’s armament is not merely a tactical choice; it is embedded in the party’s identity, which has evolved significantly since its founding in the early 1980s. Initially emerging as a grassroots resistance movement against Israeli occupation, Hezbollah gradually transformed into a sophisticated paramilitary and political entity. Throughout this evolution, external actors—most notably Iran—played a central role in shaping its ideological framework, training its fighters, and financing its operations. The weapon, in this context, became more than a means of resistance; it was institutionalized as a symbol of divine duty, regional solidarity, and political leverage. This long-standing alignment with Iran also reinforced Hezbollah’s narrative of transnational struggle, insulating it from purely national constraints and embedding the armament issue within broader geopolitical strategies. legitimacy, and socio-political utility. Within its internal ecosystem, the weapon is both a unifier and a marker of its raison d’être. Since the 2008 events of May 7, the party has adopted a security doctrine that treats any infringement upon its military structure as existential. This doctrine is designed to prevent not only state interference but also internal fragmentation or dissent. The psychological and operational cohesion of Hezbollah relies on a collective narrative of resistance, making disarmament tantamount to self-destruction in the eyes of its base.
The Lebanese State: Caught Between Sovereignty and International Pressure
Lebanon’s post-war governance has entered a phase of unprecedented external scrutiny and internal paralysis. The presence of an armed non-state actor acting across borders has directly affected the country’s diplomatic standing, making the issue of Hezbollah’s arms a precondition for international support. International actors have consistently referenced United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 in this context. Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, while Resolution 1701, passed in the aftermath of the 2006 war, mandates that only the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL operate south of the Litani River. These resolutions have shaped global expectations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security policy. In response, state institutions—particularly the Lebanese Army and security agencies—have begun signaling subtle shifts, such as publicized border operations or intercepting illicit funding flows. However, these measures remain cautious and symbolic, reflecting the state’s limited leverage and the fear of internal destabilization.
Strategic Armament: Beyond Light Weapons
The military evolution of Hezbollah into a quasi-regular army includes advanced drone programs, missile manufacturing capabilities, and elite training units. These components place the organization outside the traditional realm of militias, placing it on par with or even surpassing the military capabilities of some neighboring state armies. Hezbollah’s possession of precision-guided missiles, reconnaissance and armed drones, and sophisticated tunnel infrastructure rivals or exceeds the arsenals of conventional forces in the region such as the Lebanese Army or even elements of the Syrian military post-conflict. Compared to other non-state actors, Hezbollah’s level of operational autonomy, strategic planning, and technological advancement sets it apart, earning it the classification by some analysts as a 'hybrid actor'—blurring the lines between militia, army, and political movement. and complicate demilitarization discussions. Any negotiation now must reckon with Hezbollah’s technological depth and decentralized weapons production networks. This shift has also introduced regional security implications, as these capabilities mirror state-level deterrents and provoke preemptive action from adversaries like Israel.
Israel’s Calculated Escalation and International Paralysis
Israeli airstrikes and assassinations—often executed without multilateral notification—reflect a doctrine of preemptive security. Between November 27, 2024, and April 18, 2025, Israel conducted 313 airstrikes across Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and leadership. Notably, on September 27, 2024, an Israeli airstrike in Beirut killed Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, followed by the assassination of his presumed successor, Hashem Safieddine, on October 3, 2024. These high-profile operations underscore Israel's strategy of eliminating key figures to disrupt Hezbollah's command structure. While justified by Tel Aviv as necessary responses to threats, these actions erode the legitimacy of the ceasefire framework and weaken the role of international observers. The international community’s muted response to these escalations further disempowers Lebanon and signals a geopolitical asymmetry that Hezbollah uses to justify its military preparedness. The Lebanese state, meanwhile, bears the consequences in civilian casualties, infrastructure loss, and political fragmentation.
Conclusion: A Flawed Status Quo and the Illusion of Return
The belief that the recent conflict is a passing episode betrays a fundamental misreading of regional dynamics. The structure of deterrence in Lebanon has been irreversibly altered. Neither the state nor Hezbollah can return to the pre-war equilibrium. The future will demand new frameworks—perhaps constitutional, certainly regional—that address the legitimacy of armed resistance, the boundaries of sovereignty, and the conditions for sustainable peace. Viable alternatives to the status quo could include the gradual integration of Hezbollah’s strategic arsenal into the national defense strategy, the establishment of a regional security dialogue involving Iran and the Gulf states, and a phased international disarmament support package tied to economic and governance reforms. Such pathways would require unprecedented political consensus and international guarantees, but they represent a more realistic alternative to the illusion of a simple return to past arrangements. Clinging to pre-2023 paradigms is not only unwise, it is strategically untenable.